Description: Deliberate Discretion? by Charles R. Shipan, John D. Huber Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the U.S. states. FORMAT Hardcover LANGUAGE English CONDITION Brand New Publisher Description The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process. Table of Contents 1. Laws, bureaucratic autonomy and the comparative study of delegation; 2. Rational delegation or helpless abdication? The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians; 3. Statutes as blueprints for policy making processes; 4. A comparative theory of legislative discretion and the policy making process; 5. Legislation, agency policy making and Medicaid in Michigan; 6. The design of laws across separation of powers systems; 7. The design of laws across parliamentary systems; 8. Laws, institutions, and policy making processes. Review This is a remarkable book. It is embedded firmly in the well-established new institutionalist literature on comparative politics. And it extends a well-recognized debate over how (and how carefully) elected politicians delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats. Yet, for all its pedigree, it is original, innovative, and important. It is bold in its theoretical scope, impressive for its painstaking attention to empirical detail, and, for all that, a pleasure to read ... This will be the most important book in delegation since Kiewiet and McCubbinss The Logic of Delegation a decade ago. Japanese Journal of Political Science ... this is an outstanding book that should be read by anyone interested in legislative-bureaucratic relations. West European Politics ... remarkable ... This book asks a very crucial, yet little examined question .... Journal of Public Policy Promotional This book explains the different approaches legislators use when they write laws. Review Quote "This remarkable book tackles a difficult question in comparative politics: why, when, and how (and how far) legislative majorities mircomanage bureaucracies. The authors answers combine the rigor of a formal model of delegation with the sweep that comes from arguments that can be applied both to the institutions of U.S. states and many parliamentary democracies. The results persistent theme that legislators control each other by controlling bureaucracy is rich with political insight into situations arising in coalitions and divided government, an exemplar of how systematic comparative analysis can pry important empirical implications from theoretical models." Jim Alt, Havard University Promotional "Headline" This book explains the different approaches legislators use when they write laws. Description for Bookstore Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the US states. Description for Library Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the US states. Details ISBN0521817447 Author John D. Huber Pages 304 Publisher Cambridge University Press Series Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Year 2002 ISBN-10 0521817447 ISBN-13 9780521817448 Format Hardcover Publication Date 2002-10-07 Imprint Cambridge University Press Subtitle The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy Place of Publication Cambridge Country of Publication United Kingdom DEWEY 328.37 Short Title DELIBERATE DISCRETION Language English Media Book Affiliation Columbia University, New York Illustrations 18 Tables, unspecified; 18 Line drawings, unspecified DOI 10.1604/9780521817448 UK Release Date 2002-10-07 AU Release Date 2002-10-07 NZ Release Date 2002-10-07 Alternative 9780511804915 Audience Professional & Vocational We've got this At The Nile, if you're looking for it, we've got it. With fast shipping, low prices, friendly service and well over a million items - you're bound to find what you want, at a price you'll love! TheNile_Item_ID:91371390;
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ISBN-13: 9780521817448
Book Title: Deliberate Discretion?
Number of Pages: 304 Pages
Publication Name: Deliberate Discretion?: the Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy
Language: English
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Item Height: 229 mm
Subject: Economics, Government
Publication Year: 2002
Type: Textbook
Item Weight: 620 g
Author: Charles R. Shipan, John D. Huber
Item Width: 152 mm
Format: Hardcover
